

University Governance

Questions for a New Era

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Introduction

1. **Sustainable futures:** The report, *Securing a Sustainable Future for Higher Education in the United Kingdom*, introduced by Lord Browne of Madingley on 12 October 2010, heralds a new era. Although the Browne Report is a drastic example of withdrawal of the state from institutional funding, it brings together trends evident in government policy across Europe, North America and Australasia for the last twenty-five years. While the shift of costs from the state to the UK or European Union student has attracted most immediate attention, and Lord Browne's recommendations are only being implemented in part across English universities, his Report has significant long-term consequences for institutional governance. It is but one of several contemporary circumstances, listed below, that are already affecting perceptions of the adequacy and appropriateness of governance in many UK universities.

2. **State denial:** By 2015 students will be the undisputed majority funders of most English universities. Government increasingly takes on the role of loan facility to students rather than direct funder of institutions for their educational provision. Any future teaching grants to institutions will be made to priority areas, such as sciences; any future student grants will be made to UK students for means-tested maintenance support. Through this transition, the state's stake, both moral and financial, is weakened and the stake of students, or more correctly alumni, is strengthened. On current projections, a majority of erstwhile students will still be making repayments against their government loan well into their fifties, when a majority will still not have paid it all back.

3. **Corporate crisis:** The global economic crisis, triggered by spectacular failures in banking governance during 2008, has given reason to question the growing acceptance of corporate tendencies in university governance since the late 1990s. Several lessons have been learned from the banking debacle: governors do need to understand the core business over which

they have authority, and demonstrate a wide range of specialist skills in relation to that business; the interests of governors do need to be patent and to connect more directly with the interests of stakeholders and shareholders. The failures in banking governance have proven hard to correct partly because of the limits of regulatory authority of any one state.

4. Entrepreneurial necessity: Universities are increasingly mixed businesses, playing in different ways in a variety of educational and research fields. Year by year, their publicly funded percentage drops. The slow speed of traditional state regulation as well as of internal academic processes now directly conflicts with the speed required in entrepreneurial activity: to capture a market niche, respond rapidly to changing international trends, close down selective operations, or develop new business with external partners. This changing balance of public and private enterprise affects the balance, needs and speed required of institutional governance. University governance has been moving away from slower forms of civic-minded external and collegial internal governance, but towards what has been less clear.

5. Academic neutrality: With an increasing play to market forces both in higher education and in research, the traditional "neutral space" of academia – based upon its dedication to professing the truth without fear or favour – can be threatened. Periodic crises of confidence in research results, whether in global warming and pharmaceutical testing, rehearse this threat. Within the curriculum, intellectual liberalism frequently runs up against the dictates of employability or professional accreditation. Governance has an important, sometimes a required, role in protecting that academic freedom, freedom of speech and, hence, academic neutrality.

6. Interests, skills, authority: This short study maintains that such contemporary circumstances as these raise significant, new questions for the governance of British, and more specifically English, universities: whose interests should governors serve in future? what skills should be required of them? what authority should they hold, or should be held over them?

7. Study purpose: This study does not seek to survey the vast literature on governance penned over the last three decades. That is well summarised in *Managing Good Governance in Higher Education* by Michael Shattock (2006). Much of that literature asserts or measures conformity to "commonsense" models of best practice, along a rough spectrum from commercial corporate to collegial. This study recognises that many current guides, even that

of the Committee of University Chairs (revised in 2009), are already out-of-date through failing to ask afresh questions of "for whom?" "with what?" and "why?". Their "commonsense" emphasis on "how?" can easily be interpreted as complacency or the continuance of the assumptions of an existing governance class. New answers are needed to questions of principle in governance that are emerging from a world of fewer certainties, sharper pressures and heightened moral tensions.

Setting the Scene

8. **Steering:** Governance is about steering, not rowing. In contrast to the more commercial "director", "governor" implies an oversight, a trust (hence, the North American and charity equivalent of "trustee"), but not a denial of final responsibility.

9. **Institutional business:** Higher education governors steer an education-and-research institution. Education (including teaching and learning) and research are the core "business" of the university. Indeed, the university could be considered to be constituted through their synergy. Governors take ultimate responsibility for this higher education enterprise. Governors may also steer the directions of other consequential issues, such as employability, community engagement and social mobility, but the core business is education and research.

10. **Two pillars?:** Most universities, in some form or another, recognise two pillars of university governance: a Board of Governors (or Council), and an Academic Board (or Senate). While most Boards of Governors now have a majority of external members, the Academic Board is almost universally comprised of staff and students, selected on some representational and/or *ex officio* basis. The Academic Board addresses issues of academic quality and standards, both in education and in research, as a leading example of the academic "self-governance" sometimes practised more extensively in individual faculties or departments. It is, however, sometimes constituted as a committee of the Board of Governors so that the ultimate responsibility of the Board of Governors for all aspects of the institution's operations is not compromised. Sometimes, however, the Academic Board fulfils an advisory function to the Vice-Chancellor, who is then wholly responsible to the Board of Governors, or it reports to some kind of Supervisory Board (or Court), as may also then the other pillar of governance, the Board of Governors. This study concentrates upon institutional governance, in particular the Board of Governors.

11. **Broader governance:** University governance, then, is a much broader issue than just the activities of the Board of Governors. It can include: state regulation; guidance by external stakeholders; academic self-governance; managerial self-governance; competition within and between institutions. In a study conducted across England, the Netherlands, Germany and Austria, Schimank (2005) found a common contraction of academic self-governance, and increasing common emphasis upon guidance by external stakeholders, managerial self-governance and institutional competition. The one deviation concerned state regulation, which was then reducing in the three continental countries but increasing significantly in England.

Interests

12. **Interests in the institution:** A university has many competing interests. Students want a good-quality education and exciting social experiences. Staff want to get on with delivering the core business or supporting that delivery. Businesses want well-educated employees and to supply services. The community wants an intellectual, possibly entrepreneurial, hub. The bureaucracy seeks "value for money", while governments want policy outcomes and so to be re-elected.

13. **Governor interests:** Any community of governors, too, brings many different interests to the table: perpetuation or reform of institutional ethos; connection with local community; family tradition or obligation; stakeholder representation; devotion of professional expertise; political commitment; "pro bono" work requirement; "gong hunting", through undertaking a charity role; opportunities for building new business links and commercial connections.

14. **The flux of internal interests:** Universities have their competing priorities, for instance, between educational and research investment, the fostering of enterprise activity, and devotion to community service. There is interest in keeping a healthy financial bottom line but also in growing scholarly reputation and providing models of intellectual or moral response to difficult questions. A university is also subject to an ever-shifting balance between disciplinary and professional interests, reflective of broader trends in society and employment, but also a product of its own internal hierarchies of intellect and achievement.

Universities cross-subsidise activities in recognition of these shifting balances as well as to maintain the scholarly "completeness" befitting the very name of "university".

15. **The state's interest:** Once predominating, and legitimated through its majority funding stake, the state's interest becomes of lesser significance and lesser moral authority through the coming years of massive cost-shift to the student. While the interests of the government, the bureaucracy and the undifferentiated "public" can be distinguished from one another, all are diminished through the state's lessening funding stake in individual institutions. The "public interest" in future is more protected through regulation than, in the past, asserted through conditions over expenditure of substantial public funds. Of course, the current situation of research is less extreme than that of education, but the lowered trajectory of public funding to both is clear.

16. **The business interest:** Recent UK government policy could have sought a higher contribution from business to university funding, given the hundreds of thousands of new graduates annually provided to business, but government explicitly sought not to do so. Its view is that business is there to make profits, and thereby, through paying taxes, already contributes enough to higher education costs. Now, in the era of the student as funding agent, a majority of students will not gain any direct benefit from those taxes for their higher education tuition costs. If anything, those taxes will make up the shortfall of an inefficient government-backed loan facility. This observation does not mean that business-university links are not vital. Rather, it suggests that business will continue to command an insignificant financial stake in most individual universities. Moreover, business-driven reforms of university governance, such as initiated by Richard Lambert (2003), need to be reassessed as they envisaged neither such a reduction in the state's contribution (to which business contributed) nor such an increase in the students' stake. The business interest, then, comes with an unclear sense of authority in the newly emerging era.

17. **Running whose interests?:** The question "in whose interests is the institution being run?" is crucial. In recent years the business interest has been more represented on most Boards of Governors. This is partly through a view of government that business people do know how to run a business, partly through use of a narrowly conceived "skills matrix" in recruiting governors, and partly through a greater willingness of business people to take part. With this change has grown the largely undebated assumption that the university exists to

provide qualified workers for businesses, normally according to some unstated assumptions of priority, utility or financial advantage to business itself. The non-debate over the prioritisation of science subjects in Lord Browne's report is one embarrassing example of such an assumption, with its view that these subjects are implicitly more "important to the well being of our society and to our economy" (Browne, 2010, 25).

18. **Inter-generational interests:** The "new era" poses a series of new questions, as well as new answers to old questions. The punitive, sometimes inter-generational nature of much government policy has been noted, not least by the Minister for Universities and Science, David Willetts, in his *The Pinch: How the Baby Boomers Stole their Children's Future* (2010). Now, in higher education, we move away from at-the-time institutional funding by government towards across-the-decades personal loan repayment. That is, this debt is generationally specific, and carried by that generation across the majority of its working life. High-earning baby boomers, for instance, do not contribute, as they have done to institutional funding paid through general taxation, and most will be dead before they have to contribute to residual loan write-offs (from 2046). "New governance" needs, then, to consider how a highly repaying younger generation's interests are fostered through greater attention to generational equalities on University Boards, which are now largely dominated by ageing baby boomers.

19. **Student interests:** With the new funding system, students, through loans or up-front payments, will eventually be providing the majority of income in a majority of institutions. This is already the case in several UK universities with high proportions of international or postgraduate students. That is, students, in one way or another, will hold the main financial stake, in many less research intensive institutions providing as high as eighty per cent of annual income.

20. **Student and staff interests:** The ethos of an institution is important. Where the institutional purpose is one essentially of provision, students will hopefully experience good educational services, and leave satisfied with their consumption. Staff will feel appropriately remunerated for the professional services they have provided. With the collegial compact there is something more: students and staff are co-members of the same academic enterprise, the same learning community. The staff member is a learner as well as a teacher or facilitator, united with the student in passion for disciplinary or professional knowledge or

skills. Under the consumerist model, the residual interests of both are more likely to be extinguished after departure than under the collegial compact, where the institutional affiliation ideally becomes a lifelong badge of honour and an enduring part of personal identity.

21. **Alumni interests:** Of course, under income-contingent loan arrangements it is only after graduation, as alumni, that erstwhile students start to make their loan repayments. It is the alumni, then, rather than current students, who become the largest funders of the institution across succeeding decades. A new governance question emerges of how this major, even majority, funding stake should be represented in institutional governance? The closest parallel is that of the private universities of the United States, where the student investment in high tuition fees leads to power and recognition as alumni. Sometimes this is reflected in a majority of institutional trustees being alumni and, in the collegial model, high levels of alumni giving across a lifetime. Indeed, Lord Browne's report specifically recommended mechanisms to encourage loyal UK alumni to continue making voluntary payments to their institution after their loan is paid off, in ways that are convenient and tax deductible (Browne, 2010, 35).

22. **Student and alumni representation:** The precedents for more active student and alumni involvement in university governance are many. Former UK Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, was, while still a student, elected the Rector of the University of Edinburgh, and indeed, also Convenor of its Court. At Duke University, in North Carolina, student governors are trained as non-voting observers in their first year before gaining full voting rights in their second. The Latin American compact of university co-governance between students, staff and alumni, which has endured now for nearly a century, is a truly radical alternative to the "independent" nature of current UK governance.

23. **Changing staff and student relationship:** As co-workers in the institutional enterprise, according to the collegial compact, staff and students are often subject to similar interests, for instance, in holding management – and, indeed, governors – to account. In many regards they can do this better than independent (lay) governors because of their daily experience of institutional life and regular opportunity to witness the implementation of agreed policies. The changing financial base of universities, however, now reinforces the difference between staff and students in terms of financial stake. By

2015, the student becomes responsible for a majority of income in so many institutions, while staff remain the majority of expenditure. This can easily lead to a more directly consumerist, rather than collegial or communitarian, relationship between staff and students.

24. The interests debate: At heart, this debate is between an old ethos of public service, reinforced by high levels of government funding, and an emerging ethos of market-oriented entrepreneurialism that more overtly serves the interests of those paying for the service; between the interests of little-funding business and that of much-funding students or alumni, who nonetheless do want a job; between the interests of students or alumni and those of minority funders (philanthropists, private research funders, government) as well as the broader community; between the ultimate education-and-research purpose of the institution and more immediate employment and accreditational purposes.

25. More representative governance: This growing interests debate, heightened by funding changes, suggests newly emerging balances of interests, more directly related to the financial stake. It signals a move towards a more overt, more passionate balance in institutional governance and away from the dispassionate, "independent" adjudication of matters in the interest of an undefined public that is still found in current governance guides (CUC, 2009, 19) and much governance practice. This may mean a move back to a more representative model, but now of funding stakes and coalitions of institutional interests, rather than of diverse community interests through trusteeship of the once public, or publicly funded, institution.

26. The institutional interest: The funding changes of coming years underscore the real autonomy of universities, something that Boards of Governors have chosen to emphasise in recent years but which is now an imminent funding reality. Governors then, while respecting all conditions attached to government funding and regulation, must primarily serve the complex of stakes that is the institutional interest. Where that conflicts with the public interest – for instance, in the setting of tuition fees, disposal of property, or entrance into commercial ventures – then the institutional interest can reasonably be expected to prevail.

27. Conflicts of interest: At times of rapid change of interests in and of the institution, conflicts will proliferate. This is not just a technical issue of financial or other gain to governors or their immediate associates. It involves genuine conflicts between competing

stakeholder groups over institutional priorities, as well as conflicts of belief: how much *should* an autonomous university be acting in more than its own immediate self-interest? As well, there is the difficult issue of how a dispassionate, adjudicational Board starts to embrace the more passionately articulated stakes of various interest groups.

Skills

28. **Responsibilities:** Boards of Governors need skills to match their responsibilities. Although there is some common understanding in the UK of their ultimate responsibilities, how those responsibilities are exercised in individual institutions is less clear. Governors are often wary, for instance, of "intruding" directly into traditional areas of academic self-governance. The Board, for instance, must own the strategic directions of the institutions, but while some Boards respond to plans brought forward by their management, others initiate their own processes and demand of management that they follow their agreed plan. The Board must approve the appointment of specified senior staff, but how much is it involved in their selection or recruitment? The Board must ultimately take responsibility for all academic and administrative activities of the institution, but can it reasonably be expected to have its own expertise in areas of student complaints, fee-setting or commercialisation of research?

29. **The skills matrix:** Such matrices of professional skills are a common way of assessing the appropriateness of the backgrounds of Board members for the Board's duties, and also of selecting new members. Given the inherited main agenda areas of the Board – such as finance, audit, estates, human resources – it is not surprising that professional expertise in these areas is considered advisable or, in some cases, required. Expertise in other designated areas of equality, students' unions, and health and safety may also be desirable, and so feature on the matrix.

30. **Disciplines and backgrounds:** Certain configurations of disciplinary (social sciences, humanities, creative arts, technology, engineering, physical sciences, health sciences) and social (socio-economic, ethnic, gender, regional/international, religious, family/alumni) backgrounds are clearly desirable for particular universities. In an age of shifting balances of interest, these need to be considered as carefully as the skills matrix, lest a university replicate the "people like us" phenomenon of the Anglo-Saxon corporate world.

31. **Core-purpose skills:** The Board, above all, must have a good knowledge of the institution's core purposes, of education and research. This is not just because finances, estate and human resources are to be devoted in an efficient manner to support educational and research purposes, but also because the strategic directions of the university -- primarily in education and research -- are to be debated, approved and updated, in light of performance, by the Board. Knowledge in education (such as curriculum, assessment, pedagogy, demand, funding) and research (fundamental, applied, third-stream, demand, funding) is only infrequently referenced at the Board level. This can lead to overall Board incompetence in dealing with core business or ineffective holding of management to account.

32. **Values:** Knowledge, however, is not enough. Values are equally important, as they reflect the various goals of the academic enterprise. A university has several bottom lines. Financial, human-capital and environmental bottom lines, for instance, reflect different, but hopefully inter-locking, values. Each institution will have a different balance between these values, reflected in its overall positioning as an autonomous institution. The most difficult value for independent governors to understand is often the symbolic, which can be the most powerful driver of scholarly regard. The symbolic is of huge importance in balancing intrinsic (good as something) and instrumental (good for something) aspects of the enterprise, and so minimising reputational risks.

33. **Amateurism:** The formulation of "twelve good men, and true" is insufficient in meeting the complex, increasingly entrepreneurial, needs of higher education, its governance, management and oversight. The self-check, in current governance guides, that governors need to satisfy *themselves* that they have an ability to contribute to institutional governance reinforces these vestiges of well-intentioned amateurism. As with financial, legal or audit expertise, the Board needs to establish the individual governor's overall profile at all stages of appointment, review and reappointment, and assure itself that it has the best set of members to serve the institution's needs.

34. **Board accountability:** Increasingly stakeholders will want to hold not just the management but also the Board of Governors accountable for their actions and to be reassured of the Board's ability and inclination to steer the university in changeable times. That accountability might be provided through stakeholder access to regular Board meetings or annual convocations when a Board's activities can be held up to scrutiny. The new

funding era calls for more emphasis upon demonstration of educational and research quality, and more efficient use of all resources to that end. It requires also a more detailed understanding at the Board level of international and philanthropic opportunities, and of sharing of services and venture risk with others. This does not mean that Boards need to become bigger, but rather that their members need to be as multivalent as possible and appointed as a result of a customised and transparent search procedure.

35. Remuneration for governors: Is this asking too much from unremunerated governors? In an age of autonomous, increasingly entrepreneurial, largely self-funded universities there must be a greater annual expectation of governors than the traditional four or five Board meetings, some additional committee work, and the occasional Away Day. In keeping with the privatisation that has been thrust upon the sector, it may be better that governors, or at least those in leading positions such as committee chairs, be remunerated. Better that than Boards fail to exercise their responsibilities in a fully competent and dedicated fashion, and the entire institution be at higher risk. Of course, one aspect of the independence of the governors is then compromised – they also are on the payroll – but, as already argued under "Interests", that emphasis upon independence may no longer be as appropriate as it once was.

Authority

36. Legal and moral authority: Governors govern by virtue of legal authority, established for instance in a royal charter and statutes or in articles of governance. As charity trustees and sometimes company directors, they have clearly defined legal rights and obligations. Governors also govern by virtue of moral authority, particularly through the extent to which they can command stakeholder confidence and stand as worthy advocates of the institutional interest.

37. Autonomy: By international comparison, British universities have a high degree of autonomy. Unlike in many countries, they can appoint and promote staff at all levels, approve new courses, select research activities, and, in theory at least, determine their own directions. The authority for all these actions resides ultimately with the university's Board of Governors rather than external authorities. As moments of institutional crisis illustrate, British universities do not derive their authority through acts of provincial or state parliament, as in Canada or Australia, through the Church as in many European (and some UK)

universities, or through leading families or clans, as in South and East Asia. Nor is their authority normally subject to the oversight of supervisory boards, as found in northern Europe, although sometimes some supervisory functions are reserved to a university Court.

38. **Buffered institutions?:** British universities, then, inhabit a distinctive zone between the public sector, of which they are not formally a part, and the truly private sector, such as the University of Buckingham. They are regulated by the "buffer bodies" of funding councils, such as HEFCE, but these bodies cannot directly intervene in the governance of autonomous institutions. Rather, they can apply pressure through their funding allocations and demand adherence to grant conditions. A report of the National Audit Office on sectoral sustainability from March 2011 records the increasing risks of the new funding environment, and calls for a new regulatory approach (2011, 7). It asks for clarification from the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills of the authority of the funding council to intervene in an institution "to protect the interests of taxpayers and students" (2011, 7), as well as "when to manage the taxpayers' disengagement from an institution should this be in the public interest" (2011, 7). Most tellingly, it seeks clarification of what the funding council's role would be at all with institutions which receive no grant funding but whose students receive tuition-fee loans (2011, 7).

39. **Internal Board responsibility:** These autonomous Boards, whose activities are largely still guided by honour-based codes of "public" practice, are technically responsible to no one beyond themselves. Their legal and financial responsibilities as governor, trustee or director must, of course, be acquitted. But the moral responsibilities of governors need particularly now to be emphasised: both through one governor's scrutiny of another, and their combined reflection of the interests of institutional stakeholders. In particular, such an autonomous Board must not become dominated by a self-perpetuating clique, for the Board's authority is diminished in proportion to the diminution of stakeholder influence upon the selection and renewal of governors, as also by the extent to which governors do not engage in regular challenge of each other. So, another answer to the time-honoured question of "who guards the guards?" in an autonomous system is that one governor must be a zealous and alert guardian of another.

40. **Stakeholder authority:** As direct public funding dwindles, even the formulation "publicly funded" is becoming problematic for universities, a circumstance noted by the

National Audit Office in its recent report (2011, 7). Now, with the rising student and alumni stake, the accountabilities both of management and the Board of Governors will gain increasing attention of the key stakeholders: students and alumni as chief funders; staff, as the greatest institutional investment and often key opinion formers; the broader community, as chief source of employment. A key question will be how effectively the Board of Governors can retain the trust and confidence of the various stakeholder groups, particularly the students and alumni.

41. **The ultimate trust:** Beyond being guardians of assets, strategic directions and institutional ethos, what governors are ultimately guarding is the very heart of the system: academic neutrality. That is why academic freedom is sometimes included in university charters, giving governors a special overseeing responsibility. This freedom allows academic staff to challenge received wisdom and be protected in doing so, however unpopular or controversial their ideas might be. On the other hand, the Board has a role in guarding against political and commercial interference, especially in matters of academic standards or the integrity of research results. The case in March 2011 of Libyan relationships with the London School of Economics, leading to the resignation of its Director, highlights how rapidly a reputation for academic neutrality can be tarnished. It emphasises the important role of governors in swiftly overseeing a remedy to such circumstances. At such moments it is those with the strongest stake in the brand – the alumni – who are among the keenest guardians of that neutral space.

Conclusions: Questions for a New Era

42. **State denial:** The withdrawal of the state as chief funding agent of higher education creates new balances in governance authority. The body which can be most expected to fill that space is the alumni, as they now become the chief funding agent of most English universities in direct replacement of that state interest, through their decades-long repayment of state-provided loans. The alumni also have the greatest, life-long stake in the institution's reputation and its protection. They understand the institution's symbolic value.

43. **Corporate crisis:** The move towards greater emulation of corporate models from the business world, initiated over the last decade, seems to have stalled, in part because of the inadequacy of the model for the corporate world itself and in part because of its lack of

responsiveness to changing stakeholder interests. The very independence of governor interests in this model does not regularly transplant well to higher education. The current flurry of employability demands directly from government masks the failure of employers and business directly to establish a sufficient financial or moral stake within universities. The question for universities now is how to build more passionate, committed, representative governing bodies, without damaging existing links with employers or their involvement in institutional employability programmes. Of course, many alumni will themselves be employers, but the legitimacy of their stake comes more by virtue of the former than the latter characteristic.

44. **Entrepreneurial necessity:** Academia's slowness to change and conservational approaches towards knowledge have sometimes been its strength, but may now present as a dangerous weakness. The necessity to compete in increasingly open markets, with less regulated, often international competitors, poses challenges to all forms of institutional governance and management, as well as to orderly industrial relations. That necessity for entrepreneurial speed and confidentiality suggests: more delegation of authority to postholders; more advisory, rather than determinative, roles for committees; and more ambiguous questions of ownership of privileged information. It also suggests that governing bodies themselves may move to mimic senior management, through bestowing greater authority upon committee chairs, in fact, creating a cabinet of chairs. That can raise difficult questions about the expectations of members of the Board outside this cabinet of chairs, particularly staff and student members, who may feel they are not full participants in decisions for which they will nevertheless carry responsibility.

45. **Academic neutrality:** The most distinctive quality of the university is its neutral space. This underscores the university's role as academic standard bearer. In an age of media spin, naturally partisan government, and the profit-maximising corporate motive, society looks even more than previously to its universities for trustworthy research results and verifiable educational standards. If institutional autonomy is to be maintained, then new alumni governors are in a good position to reinforce that ethical basis to research and education once held in trust by the undifferentiated public. Hopefully, they have been inculcated in that ethic as students.

46. **Interests, skills, authority:** Universities are hard to govern. A strongly independent Board is not necessarily the best guardian of an autonomous university. At moments of

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governance crisis, and holding no stake of dependency, independent governors can act to protect *their* professional or private interests and *their* reputation over those of the autonomous institution. Authority is better based in a body that actively and passionately represents the relative interests of the key university stakeholders. That representational balance is more likely to be found in a Board of Governors chosen, and reappointed, for the diversity of its members' attributes: knowledge of education and research, professional matrix skills, disciplinary and social background, along with a good understanding of the values enshrined in the institutional mission.

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