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Today’s piece is by Jane Embley, Chief People Officer, Northumbria University and Professor Tom Lawson, Deputy Vice-Chancellor and Provost, Northumbria University.
The end of the Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS) pensions dispute in the summer of 2023 was the source of much relief in the sector. University employees in the scheme saw both their pension benefits restored to the levels they had been before the USS valuation of 2017 and a reduction in their contributions (from January 2024) from 9.8% to 6.1%. Employers could reverse the significant liabilities that had previously been skewing their financial statements and their contributions to USS were reduced from 21.6% to 14.5%. The Financial Times declared that ‘the cost to UK universities of providing pensions for employees is poised to fall by hundreds of millions of pounds after the sector’s main retirement plan swung into surplus after more than a decade of being in deficit’.
But for many institutions the great pensions crisis was not over: indeed it had only just begun. For at least 80 universities, USS is not their main pension scheme, because those that gained university status through the 1992 Higher Education Act are required to offer Teachers Pension Scheme (TPS) to their academic staff. This includes institutions like Northumbria University, which has significantly developed its research intensity over the last decade and seeks to compete with other research intensives. The disparity in the costs of TPS and USS means that competition is no longer on a level playing field.
Northumbria has more than 200 staff who are members of USS, but all of those have joined the university as existing members of that scheme. All other academic colleagues must be enrolled in TPS and cannot, at present, voluntarily become members of USS. Indeed those who join as members of USS also retain a right to be enrolled in TPS if they wish. Around 50 modern institutions employ some members of USS however the underlying requirement to make TPS available to university-employed academic staff is the same.
Since 2023 the cost of TPS to both employees and employers has significantly diverged from USS. While employers’ contributions to the two schemes tracked one another closely until October 2019, they then began to diverge radically when TPS employer contributions rose to 23.68% while USS was at 21.1%. But in April 2024 the gulf between the two schemes became a chasm – TPS contributions rose by 5% to 28.68% as USS employer contributions went down to 14.5%.
The difference in percentage terms is stark. But when you start to think about the financial cost for institutions it is all the more so. The pension cost (to employers) for a typical academic salary of £57,500 is £8,300 per annum for USS. For a TPS employee, it is £16,500. At an institutional level that means that for every 1000 staff earning this salary in TPS, the annual cost is £8.2 million greater than if those same employees were members of USS. For a professor earning £85,000 the difference is as much as £12,000 per full-time colleague. As Northumbria’s experience shows, these are additional costs being carried in one part of the sector for essentially the same staff.
The situation is compounded by the nature of TPS as a scheme. Unlike USS, employers have no say in how the TPS is run and have no levers to keep employer (and indeed employee) contributions down. This is simply a cost handed down to universities by the Treasury. But unlike schools, to which the Treasury through the Department for Education provides additional funding to cover TPS cost increases, universities receive no relief and simply have to absorb these costs into their already stretched budgets. And unlike schools in the independent sector, which were permitted to stop offering TPS to new staff, universities are obliged to continue to offer TPS – whatever alternatives they can develop for their staff.
The impact of this is extraordinary. It essentially means that in one part of the sector, it costs employers the same amount in on-costs to employ 503 staff as it costs to employ 1000 staff elsewhere. Quite apart from the burden this places on institutions, it is deeply anti-competitive.
What then is to be done? The path forward is beset by problems. Unless there is legislative change, modern universities will be required to continue to make TPS available to all academic colleagues and, it bears repeating, will continue to have no say at all in the running of the scheme.
Of course, one option is to do nothing, but the finances of the sector mean the status quo is extraordinarily difficult to justify. Doing nothing embeds an unfairness that makes the government’s stated priorities for university reform more difficult to achieve. To put it crudely, it costs more for some institutions than others to employ academic staff, and as that resource is derived (at least in part) from student fee income then those institutions will require more students to fund the salaries of staff. For every 1000 staff earning £57,500 it would require all of the fees from 859 additional UK undergraduate students just to fund the difference in employer pension contributions.
Institutions can employ new colleagues via subsidiary companies in order to give themselves the freedom to offer more affordable pensions to new employees. But this approach has many potential pitfalls. It would not help to reduce the costs in relation to existing staff, so would be slow to have any impact, and in any case it remains unclear what the status of such employees is according to HESA – which could among other things impact the ability of individuals to make a contribution to future REF exercises with the attendant implications for future funding. Employment through a subsidiary, even with all terms and conditions being the same but being out of scope for recognition within the REF, is also likely to be a less attractive prospect for employees.
It seems likely that until solutions are found, many institutions might find themselves having to rethink their ability to participate in national collective pay bargaining. With higher pension costs and higher National Insurance contributions, it may be necessary, for now at least, for institutions to take control of salary increases to contain the total costs of employment. This is not an attractive option, but it is hard to think of any others that would be as swift and effective in containing cost increases, although of course it would come with its own industrial relations challenges.
Ultimately all institutions value their academic staff immensely and we want to provide access to attractive pension schemes. However, the lack of institutional control over which pension scheme can be offered, and the high, fixed nature of the employer contribution to TPS (which is not directly linked to any improvement in benefits for the individual) cannot be sustained. The timing of the current challenge could also not be worse. Institutions are grappling with a whole range of financial pressures, and as a consequence dealing with TPS remains in the ‘too hard’ box for many, not least because we genuinely cannot find the solutions without some form of intervention. But as the sustainability of institutions becomes all the more scrutinised, and as the sector needs to find financial efficiencies to address the concerns expressed by the Secretary of State for Education earlier in 2024, we do urgently need to find a way forward.
Obliging institutions to continue to offer TPS places greater financial constraints on precisely those universities that might do the most to widen access and give greater opportunity to those from disadvantaged backgrounds as per the government’s priorities. It is an obvious unfairness that some of students will go to institutions where it is substantially more expensive to employ staff than in other institutions that are more traditionally regarded as elite. The time is now to remove this inbuilt, and presumably unintended, unfairness and end the obligation upon modern universities to offer TPS. If that happens individual institutions and the sector as a whole can begin to chart a path to a more sustainable position in the future.
Thanx for this. But I am missing half the analysis.
How does the Teachers’ Pension Scheme differ from the Universities’ Superannuation Scheme in employees’ contributions and retirees’ benefits?
“The pension cost (to employers) for a typical academic salary of £57,500 is £8,300 per annum for USS. For a TPS employee, it is £16,500.”
Facts such as this need to be more widely understood so that the pressure to reform public sector pensions becomes so strong that radical reform can no longer be postponed.
Pension payments to employees in many parts of the public sector including teaching, local authority workers and the justice sector distort the whole UK employment market and mask the real cost to other taxpayers. With over 6 million people directly employed by the sector the impact on the UK economy is very substantial and is an important factor in the UK productivity puzzle that results in the UK appearing to be one of the least productive economies in the world.
This should be a cross party issue as recent legislation from the Labour Party in Government, concerning employers National Insurance contributions, has already shown unfair bias in the way that employer costs are being funded.
The available evidence is that the TPS employer contribution will rise to higher levels after the next actuarial valuation. Only actuaries can predict or carry out valuations but here are some notes:
* the Government Actuary Department (GAD) carries out public sector pension schemes valuation in line with rules set out in law. HM Treasury chooses the discount rate and has a policy to link it to the long-term OBR growth forecast
* HMT chose a CPI+1.7% discount rate for the last valuations because this was the OBR’s forecast for long-term economic growth back in July 2022
* in their TPS valuation report, GAD said that the reduction in the discount rate from CPI+2.4% to CPI+1.7% in isolation caused a 15.6 point rise in the Employer contribution rate. The combined effect of all the other changes deflated the core rate (ignoring April to September delay) to a 5.8 point rise (from 22.8% to 28.6%)
* OBR’s most recent long-term growth forecast is CPI+1.5%.
* Unless there’s a big change in the OBR growth forecast by 2026 or a change in the discount rate method, we should anticipate higher employer contribution rates continuing in the next valuation/contribution cycle, particularly as there will be fewer active relative to pensioner members. Obviously precise number will depend on GAD’s work and exact assumptions
* UCEA and UCU wrote a joint letter to HMT in October 2024 arguing for a different approach to selecting the TPS discount rate
* USS valuations use a different method for calculating discount rates so differences are likely to persist. There’s also a different balance between active USS members and pensioners
A very interesting article – do we have any insight as to what the rationale was for not extending USS to new Universities back in 1992?
I was slightly intrigued by the authors’ comment about how Northumbria has significantly developed its research intensity, as I would have thought additional staff recruited as a result would have been on research contracts, and so not offered the TPS scheme, and there is the potential for other more comparable cost schemes to be provided – and so this may not hold organisations back from competition with research intensives in the manner suggested?
Certainly the volatility and uncertainty we see with the Employer cost of certain schemes adds to the challenge of effective forecasting for institutions in a period all recognise as challenging.
It is a legislative anomaly that a group of “independent” institutions are obliged by law to be members of a particular pension scheme (Treasury kindly reminded everyone recently that HEIs were independent, when refusing to provide any extra money to cover the extra costs of the Teachers Pension Scheme, to which these “independent” organisations are legally obliged to belong). The 1992 requirement was introduced to ease the transition of the polytechnics out of “the public sector”, at a time when higher education was funded completely differently and the Teachers Pension Scheme was run completely differently. “Indefensible” is an overused word, but it applies to the current situation; there really is no coherent justification now for a group of universities to be singled out in law in this way. It’s irrelevant whether the TPS is a good scheme, bad scheme, funded scheme, unfunded scheme, or whatever – it isn’t for the law to compel a university to join it (or any other particular pension scheme). It’s nobody’s “fault”, since nobody in 1992 foresaw the current situation, but the ball lands in government’s court, because only government can change the law. When that is done, the ball is back in the institutions’ court, where it belongs, and they will have to decide how to proceed (which will have all sorts of challenges, but there’s no reason at that point for government to get dragged in).